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This dissertation investigates whether or not fairness is a requirement in the bank-customer 
contract. 
 
Banks are businesses which were essentially established to make profits for their shareholders. 
Their activities, products and services are still predominantly focused on making profit, 
however as banks have grown and diversified their product and service offerings so too have 
banks’ importance in society grown and banks’ impact on the financial system and individual 
customers’ lives grown.  
 
The consequences of unbridled capitalism, exploitation and unfair treatment of customers were 
devastatingly demonstrated in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. As such, banks activities can 
no longer be focused on making profit alone and they have to ensure that they contribute to the 
stability of the financial system, which includes the fair treatment of customers. 
 
Despite our banking system’s strong performance during the Global Financial Crisis, South 
African banking customers continued to experience poor outcomes and unfair treatment. This 
was to a large extent due to the fact that banks remained without a dedicated regulator. In 
addition, for the most part the bank-customer contract and fairness in the bank-customer 
contract remained to be determined in terms of the common law and the law of contract 
characterised by the principle of legal certainty or pactum sunt servanda. 
 
“…fairness and justice, like beauty, often lie in the eye of the beholder.”1 
 
The quote above, in my view, aptly sums up the difficulty which the South African judiciary 
has been grappling with for some time. Due to the difficulty in applying fairness objectively 
our judiciary has tended to overlook considerations of fairness in favour of legal certainty or 
the enforcement of contracts which have been properly entered into. 
 
                                                          
1 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) 399. 
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It is against this backdrop that I have investigated the most recent judgments related to fairness 
as well as the most recent legislative interventions which have been made by the government 
regarding fairness in the bank-customer contract. 
 
Whilst the common law related to fairness in the law of contract has now been developed to 
more closely reflect the current societal needs and values of South Africa it is evident that 
judges will still be reluctant to set aside contracts on the basis that they operate unfairly and 
this will only be done in certain circumstances as set out in Beadica 231 CC and Others v 
Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and Others 2020 (5) SA 247 (CC). 
 
The government through the enactment of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 and 
the establishment of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority has accordingly intervened to 
ensure fairness in the bank customer contract and to take steps to end unfair or harmful practices 
in the bank-customer relationship. 
 
On 3 July 2020 the Financial Sector Conduct Authority published the Conduct Standard for 
Banks with the purpose of ensuring the fair treatment of financial customers of banks and 
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The relationship between you and your bank is arguably one of the most important relationships 
you will have in your lifetime. The relationship is based on contract or a number of contracts 
for the different products/services/accounts provided to you by your bank.2 The terms and 
conditions of the contract/s set out the rights and obligations of both you and the bank. 3  
 
One of the purposes of a contract is the protection of the parties to the contract, however, when 
one of the parties to the contract is in a much stronger bargaining position than the other this 
may result in a one-sided contract which operates unfairly in this stronger party’s favour. In 
South Africa the bank-customer contract is a prime example of such a relationship where banks 
are in much stronger bargaining positions than the majority of their customers. 
 
The question that therefore needs to be answered is whether or not fairness is a requirement for 
a valid bank-customer contract in South Africa. This requirement would protect bank 
customers who are in a weaker bargaining position than banks when entering into contracts 
with them. 
 
In addition to their contractual rights and obligations banks need to adhere to the relevant laws, 
standards and codes applicable to the provision of banking services. In the past, banks’ market 
conduct (or the way in which banks conduct themselves and their businesses in relation to 
customers) was left unregulated as banks’ market conduct did not form part of the regulatory 
responsibilities of the South African Reserve Bank as a bank supervisor nor part of the 
dedicated regulatory responsibility of one of the other regulators.4 
 
Furthermore, and despite the fact that South African banks comply with the sector’s voluntary 
Code of Banking Practice and customers are able to refer complaints to the Ombudsman for 
Banking Services, until recently there was no legislation passed which specifically governed 
banks’ market conduct (barring coverage of their advice and intermediation activities under the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act5 and limited coverage by the Consumer 
                                                          
2 Moorcroft Banking Law and Practice (2015) 15-3. 
3 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 128 (C) 144. 
4 Van Heerden and Van Niekerk “Twin Peaks in South Africa: a new role for the central bank” 2018 Law and 
Financial Markets Review 1. 
5 37 of 2002. 
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Protection Act6 and the National Credit Act7).8 There has also been a tendency for courts to 
prioritise the contractual certainty over considerations of fairness when adjudicating on 
contractual disputes.9   
 
Accordingly, South African bank customers were largely left exposed to risks of unfair 
treatment. 
 
In a country such as South Africa, which is characterised by extreme levels of economic 
inequality10 as well as poor financial literacy it is particularly important that customers not just 
have access to banking, but have access to quality banking services where they are treated 
fairly.11  
 
Financial inclusion rates in South Africa are relatively high. The 2016 FinScope consumer 
survey for South Africa established that 77% of South Africans were defined as being banked.12 
Unfortunately, these statistics do not indicate the quality of accounts and/or service received 
from the banks and various studies conducted by the government indicate that customers are 
being treated unfairly by banks which has resulted in poor financial outcomes for a large 
proportion of customers who do have access to banking services.13 
 
Fortunately, the lessons learned from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis have culminated in 
government taking a more proactive approach to the regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions and importantly the market conduct of banks now has a dedicated regulatory 
authority in the form of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority established in terms of the 
Financial Sector Regulation Act.14 
                                                          
6 68 of 2008. 
7 34 of 2005. 
8 Republic of South Africa National Treasury “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: A draft market 
conduct policy framework for South Africa” Discussion Document December 2014 
www.nationaltreasury.gov.za (2-9-2018). 
9 Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
10 World Bank “The World Bank in South Africa: Overview” 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview (3-4-2019); Preamble of the Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008; Mupangavanhu “Fairness is a slippery concept: The common law of contract and the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008” 2015 De Jure 116 133. 
11 Kawadza “A snapshot of financial exclusion in South Africa” in Hugo and du Toit (eds) Annual Banking Law 
Update (2017) 43 49. 
12 FinMark Trust “Results from FinScope South Africa 2016 Survey on Financial Inclusion” 
https://www.finmark.org.za/results-from-finscope-south-africa-2016-survey-on-financial-inclusion/ (3-4-2019). 
13 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 8). 
14 9 of 2017. 
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2 WHAT IS FAIRNESS? 
 
One struggles to find a definition of fairness in legislation or case law and the Cambridge 
English dictionary describes fairness as “the quality of treating people equally or in a way that 
is right or reasonable.”15 
 
Within the banking context this definition is understandably problematic. Each customer has 
his/her own specific financial history and financial needs and to treat all customers equally 
would therefore not be treating all customers fairly.  
 
Yes all customers must be treated with the equal respect and dignity, however, banks have to 
tailor their offerings to meet specific customers’ needs thus not treating them all equally. The 
second part of the definition therefore finds application in that banks should treat all their 
customers in a way that is right and reasonable. 
 
This is again problematic however as fairness or what can be considered fair, right and 
reasonable is subjective and each person’s feeling of what is fair, right and reasonable differs. 
As Froneman J recently set out in his dissenting judgment in the matter of Beadica 231 CC and 
Others v Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and Others16 “to give content to 
fairness entails a moral choice or value judgment.”17 
 
As each person’s, and each judge’s for that matter, values and morals differ based on their 
particular circumstances it is has been difficult for our courts to establish how to arrive at what 
can be considered as fair and Van Den Heever AJ in her dissenting judgment in the matter of 
Preller and Others v Jordaan captured the difficulty which would arise if each judge were to 
make decisions based on their own interpretation of fairness: 
 
“It is a different situation where the judge infringes on the legal order and the rights that flow from the 
agreement. If he could thwart a legal act as soon as his subjective sense of fairness condemned it, there 
would be no legal certainty. In the preface to his edition of de Groot’s Introduction of 1767, Schorer says 
                                                          
15 See https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fairness (8-5-2019). 
16 2020 (5) SA 247 (CC). 
17 Ibid par 112. 
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that a judge who, according to his own common sense, can judge at his discretion and without legal rules, 
is more to be feared than dogs and snakes. I strongly agree with that.”18  
 
It is against this backdrop that we must consider how fairness in the bank-customer contract 
can be ensured. 
 
3 THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP 
 
3.1 Bank-customer relationship based on contract 
 
Banking law is not a separately identifiable branch of the law and generally relies on the 
principles of the law of contract.19 Banking law can be generally divided into the broad 
categories of public banking law and private banking law.20 
 
The laws which regulate the relationship between banks and the statutory and regulatory bodies 
which have an oversight function over banks form part of public banking law. Examples of 
public banking law are the Companies Act21 in terms of which banks are incorporated, the 
Banks Act22 in terms of which banks are registered, the National Payment System Act23, the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act24, and the Competition Act25 to name a few. 
 
Apart from the acts and various other legislative instruments regulating the banking industry 
as set out above banks have to comply with international codes and standards such as the King 
Code on Corporate Governance and Basel II and III, these codes and regulations also form part 
of public banking law. Accordingly, public banking law can be described as those laws and 
regulations which make provision for governmental oversight of money and banking and 
                                                          
18 Preller and Others v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A). Own translation to English, Afrikaans text reads as follows: 
“Dit is egter 'n ander saak waar die regter 'n inbreuk maak op die regsorde en die regte wat uit ooreenkoms vloei. 
Indien hy 'n regshandeling kan verydel sodra sy subjektiewe billikheidsgevoel dit veroordeel, sou daar geen 
regsekerheid wees nie. In die voorwoord tot sy uitgawe van de Groot se Inleiding van 1767 sê Schorer dat 'n regter 
wat volgens sy gesonde verstand, na goeddunk en sonder regsreëls kan oordeel meer te vrese is as honde en slange. 
Daarmee is ek dit roerend eens.” 
19 Malan, Pretorius and du Toit Malan on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (2009) 295. 
20 Sharrock The Law of Banking and Payment in South Africa (2016) 24; Moorcroft (n 2) 2-2. 
21 71 of 2008. 
22 94 of 1990. 
23 78 of 1998. 
24 38 of 2001. 
25 89 of 1998. 
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prescribe the activities that banks can and cannot participate in as well as what the corporate 
governance and prudential requirements are for banks.26 
 
In the past banks’ core activities related to taking of deposits and lending of money. The Banks 
Act defines the business of a bank as the acceptance or soliciting of deposits from the public 
and the utilisation of the money deposited.27 Modern banks are much more multifunctional and 
offer a very wide range of financial services to their clients and the core business of a bank has 
accordingly become quite difficult to identify.28  
 
Private banking law regulates the relationships between banks and their customers.29 It is 
generally accepted that the bank and customer relationship refers to the legal relationship which 
comes into being by way of opening a bank account and that any reference to a customer is 
reserved for a person who has opened an account with a bank.30 
 
It has also generally been accepted that the relationship that exists between the bank and its 
customers is based on contract31, however, due to its complexity the bank customer contract 
has also been described as a contract sui generis.32 The reciprocal rights and duties of the 
parties are to a great extent based on custom and usage.33 In the matter of Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd34 Moseneke J stated that: 
 
“…the relationship which exists between a banker and its customer is a collection of a number of complex 
juristic relationships which tend to vary from customer to customer, depending on the specific agreement 
which has been entered into between the customer and the bank. Naturally such relationship would 
exhibit in varying degrees certain features which have been recognised both in our common law as well 
as in various judicial dicta. However, in any given case, in my view, the proper course to take is not to 
apply a rigid and pre-existing characterisation of the customer banker legal relationship, but to examine 
the specific legal nexus which exists between a particular banker and its customer.” 
                                                          
26 Sharrock (n 20) 28 31. 
27 s 1 of the Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
28 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2d ed) 3 6. 
29 Sharrock (n 20) 24. 
30 Sharrock (n 20) 112. 
31 Oneanate decision (n 3) 144; Harding v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (6) SA 464 (C) 471; ABSA Bank v 
Hanley 2014 (2) SA 448 (SCA); Schulze “The sources of South African banking law – a twenty-first century 
perspective (part 1)” 2002 SAMLJ 438 461; Malan (n 19) 295; De Jager “Much ado about nothing? Legal 
principles on money, banks and their clients after Joint Stock Company Varvarinskoye v ABSA Bank Ltd” 2010 
SA Merc LJ 127 140.  
32 Moorcroft (n 2) 15-2. 
33 Moorcroft (n 2) 16-3. 
34 1995 (2) SA 740 (T). 
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Moseneke J accordingly appears to suggest that the best approach is not to attempt to find a 
particular pre-existing characterisation but rather to examine the specific relationship that exists 
between the bank and its customer in any given case. This approach has merit as, in principle 
and as set out above, the bank customer relationship is based on contract and parties to a 
contract or free to negotiate the terms of their contract with each other.  
 
In the matter of Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd35 Selikowitz J stated 
that the bank and customer relationship can be described as follows: 
 
“The law treats the relationship between banker and customer as a contractual one. The reciprocal rights 
and duties included in the contract are to a great extent based upon custom and usage. Although 
historically the original objective of a depositor was to ensure the safekeeping of his money, over time 
jurists have considered characterising and explaining the basic relationship as one of depositum, mutuum 
or agency. All of these approaches have on analysis proved to be inadequate. It is now accepted that the 
basic, albeit not sole, relationship between banker and customer of a current account is one of debtor and 
creditor.” 
 
In the matter of Di Giuliou v First National Bank of South Africa Limited Van Zyl J quoted the 
judgment in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd36 with approval and 
stating that “I am in respectful agreement with the proposition that the relationship between 
bank and client is contractual …”.37 
 
The relationship between each individual customer and his and her bank will vary based on the 
particular products and services provided to that customer by his or her bank. The rights and 
obligations of the bank and its customer or the relationship between them will be based on the 
terms and conditions of the contracts entered into in respect of the products and services 





                                                          
35 1995 (4) SA 510 (C). 
36 Ibid 530. 
37 (A1080/2001) [2002] ZAWCHC 33 9. 
38 Hanley decision (n 31) and Oneanate decision (n 3). 
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3.2 Fairness in the law of contract 
 
Accepting that the bank customer relationship is based on contract as set out above it is 
necessary to consider fairness as it applies to the law of contract in South Africa.  
 
A contract can be described as an agreement, based on consensus, entered into between two 
(or more) parties resulting in the creation of legal rights and obligations for the contracting 
parties.39 The South African law of contract is largely based on the common law and in terms 
of the common law the requirements for a valid contract are consensus, contractual capacity, 
lawfulness, physical possibility and adherence to the formalities.40  
 
In terms of the requirements for a valid contract, fairness can be considered under the 
requirement of lawfulness. A contract may be unenforceable on the basis that it is unlawful and 
this unlawfulness can be as a result of the contravention or non-compliance with legislation or 
the common law.41 Generally, if a contract is found to be unlawful it will be void.42 It is 
therefore important to consider whether or not an unfair contract and/or a contract which 
operates unfairly would be considered unlawful. 
 
The common law recognises private autonomy (freedom to contract) and the sanctity of 
contract (that agreements must be honoured) as cornerstones of our law of contract.43 
 
This is based on the assumption that parties to a contract have freedom of choice when entering 
into a contract and that there is equal bargaining power between the parties when the terms and 
conditions of the contract are negotiated.44 Based on these assumptions, a potential customer 
is free to accept, reject or negotiate the terms in a contract prior to entering into that contract. 
The freedom to contract on terms agreed to between the parties forms the legal basis for the 
enforceability of the terms and conditions of a contract.45 
 
                                                          
39 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (5th ed) 8 12. 
40 Nagel et al Commercial Law (3rd ed) 36 37. 
41 Christie (n 39) 337. 
42 Nagel (n 40) 86. 
43 Ibid 37. 
44 Hutchison and Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa (2012) 23. 
45 Mupangavanhu (n 10) 116 135. 
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It is important that when parties have concluded a contract they can be certain that the parties 
to the contract will act according to the terms and conditions of the contract and that when a 
dispute arises, based on the contract, they can be certain that the terms and conditions of the 
contract will be enforced/upheld.46 It is also important that when parties enter into a contract 
they accept responsibility for agreeing to the terms and conditions of the contract.47 This 
concept is known as legal certainty and enables natural and juristic persons to regulate their 
conduct and supports the efficient functioning of the economy and society at large.48 
 
The common law principle which flows from the concept of legal certainty, the freedom of 
contract and the assumption that parties to a contract have freedom of choice when entering 
into a contract is the principle of pacta sunt servanda, or the principle that agreements must be 
honoured by the parties.49 
 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda would therefore be in conflict with the judiciary amending 
or setting aside contracts entered into validly between the parties purely based on the fact that 
the terms of the contract appear to be unfair as this may be harmful to legal certainty.50 
 
The problem with this position is that parties to contracts do not always negotiate from an equal 
bargaining position. Due to this imbalance in bargaining power coupled with the low levels of 
financial literacy in South Africa banks, almost always being in a more dominant position than 
their prospective customers, may adopt a take it or leave approach leaving their prospective 
customers little choice other than to accept standard form contracts which include terms which 
may be unfair to a particular customer or group of customers or contracts with terms and 
conditions which customers and broader society may understand to be unfair.51  
 
Unless a party was deceived into entering into an agreement, a party who signs a written 
contract with the intention of being bound by the contract, is bound by the terms contained 
therein whether he has read the document or not which is known as the caveat subscriptor rule.  
                                                          
46 SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren 1964 (4) SA 760 (A) 767. 
47 Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 462. 
48 Hopkins “Constitutional values and the rule of law, they don’t mean whatever you them to mean” 2004 
SAPR/PL 433. 
49 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles (2012) 9. 
50 Christie (n 39) 14. 
51 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 8) 19. 
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In Burger v Central South African Railways52 the court explained the meaning of the caveat 
subscriptor rule as follows: 
 
“it is a sound principle of law that a man, when he signs a contract, he is taken to be bound by the ordinary 
meaning and effect of the words which appear over his signature.”53 
 
Traditionally, limited protection was afforded to the parties to a contract through the often-
conflicting principle that contracts should be entered into in good faith.54 Good faith has been 
defined as “the idea that parties to a contract should behave honestly and fairly in their dealings 
with one another”55, alternatively the “concept of bona fides or good faith has acquired a 
meaning wider than mere honesty or the absence of subjective bad faith. According to this 
extended meaning, it has an objective content which includes other abstract values such as 
justice, reasonableness, fairness and equity.”56 
 
The fact that the principle of good faith is recognised in our law does not mean that contracts 
will be just and fair on this basis alone.57 The courts will however, not enforce a contract or 
term that is plainly improper and unconscionable or unduly oppressive.58   
 
Finding the right balance between freedom and sanctity of contract, and considerations of 
fairness, remains one of the problems facing modern law of contract.59 Much of the case law 
in respect of this question shows that sanctity of contract (the pacta servanda sunt principle) 
prevails over fairness as courts seek to promote legal and commercial certainty by enforcing 
contracts that are freely and properly entered into by the parties, even if they sometimes appear 
to be unfair.60 
 
                                                          
52 1903 TS 571. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Hutchison and Pretorius (n 44) 1.8. 
55 Zimmermann and Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 
240. 
56 Brand “The role of good faith, equity and fairness in the South African law of contract: The influence of the 
common law and the Constitution” 2009 SALJ 71 73. 
57 Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reinecke Contract General Principles (2016) 9.262. 
58 Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A). 
59 Hutchison and Pretorius (n 44) 22. 
60 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Brisley v 
Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
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As the bank and customer relationship is based on contract the general legal principles which 
apply to any other contract also apply to the bank and customer contracts61 and the interplay 
between fairness and legal certainty or pactum sunt servanda will remain. 
 
In the matter of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas62 the appellate division 
confirmed that the common law remedy of exceptio doli generalis, which provided protection 
against the enforcement of an unfair contract or the enforcement of a contract in unfair 
circumstances, did not form part of the modern law of contract in South Africa. 
 
The court did point out, however, that there were still remedies available to parties where the 
contract was against the “public interest” and stated that: 
 
“Not only contracts against public interest or public policy are subject to control by the Court, but also 
those offending the boni mores. In this field reference must be made to the sense of justice ('regsgevoel') 
of the community, as is the case in delict, where it is now recognised that there is no numerus clausus of 
actionable wrongs.” 
 
Confirming the ability of a court to set aside a contract on the basis of public policy Smalberger 
JA, in the matter of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes63 stated that: 
 
“The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, however, be exercised sparingly and 
only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and 
indiscriminate use of power. One must be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to public 
policy merely because its terms (or some of them) offend one’s individual sense of proprietary and 
fairness.” 
 
In the matter of Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd64 the court upheld the position 
set out in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes65 and set out a method to deal with contractual terms which 
are “plainly improper and unconscionable” or “unduly harsh and oppressive”. The court stated 
that:- 
 
                                                          
61 Moorcroft (n 2) 15-3. 
62 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A). 
63 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
64 Botha (now Griessel) decision (n 56). 
65 Sasfin decision (n 63). 
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“In such an investigation there must be borne in mind: (a) that while public policy generally favours the 
utmost freedom of contract, it nevertheless properly takes into account the necessity for doing simple 
justice between man and man; and (b) that a court’s power to declare contracts contrary to public policy 
should be exercised sparingly and only in cases in which the impropriety of the transaction and the 
element of public harm are manifest.” 
 
Accordingly, while unfairness in a contract could be grounds for setting it aside courts took the 
view that the mere fact that a term is unfair or may operate harshly does not in itself mean that 
the contract should be set aside or that a term is contrary to public policy, or that it should not 
be enforced, courts generally favoured the enforcement of a contract on the grounds of legal 
certainty and pactum sunt servanda.  
 
The common law does not, however, operate in a vacuum and needs to be developed, where 
necessary, to ensure that it reflects the current societal needs and values of South Africa as well 
as public policy considerations and importantly is subject to the Constitution66 as well as any 
other legislation which is passed by parliament.67 
 
The Constitution does not prescribe the requirements for the validity of a contract, however, 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution specifically provides that courts are expected to develop the 
common law in accordance with the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.68 Since 
the implementation of the Constitution there has been a concerted effort by the legislature as 
well as the judiciary to develop the law to promote a system of law in South Africa which 
reflects the fundamental values of freedom, equality and dignity upon which the Constitution 
is based.69  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the preference of our courts to uphold the freedom of contact and 
legal certainty, to reject the lack of good faith as basis for setting aside a contract and for 
restrictively allowing the remedy of public policy as a mechanism for fairness in contracts has 
resulted in the lack of a substantive defence to contracts with unfair terms and conditions.70   
 
                                                          
66 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and Bredenkamp decision (n 9) 39. 
67 Brand (n 56) 71 72. 
68 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
69 Du Plessis and others v De Klerk and another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC); Carmichle v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 
138 (CC); Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
70 Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 385. 
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In the matter of Barkhuizen v Napier71 the Constitutional Court had the opportunity to apply 
the principles of the Constitution to the debate between freedom and sanctity of contract and 
considerations of fairness.  
 
The case revolved around the fairness of a clause in an insurance contract which limited the 
time within which the insured could institute legal action against the insurance company once 
the insurance company had rejected the insured’s claim. The insured averred, amongst others, 
that the clause was contrary to public policy considerations as it infringed on his rights to access 
the Courts.72 The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the time bar clause in the insurance 
contract was not unconstitutional:  
 
“Nor does the fact that a term is unfair or may operate harshly by itself lead to the conclusion that it 
offends against constitutional principle. As explained in Brisley (para 94), the Constitution prizes dignity 
and autonomy, and in appropriate circumstances these standards find expression in the liberty to regulate 
one’s life by freely engaged contractual arrangements. Their importance should not be under-
estimated.”73 
 
In the Constitutional Court the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal was upheld and the 
appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal was dismissed. In her Judgment 
Ngcobo J submitted that there is “no reason either in logic or in principle why public policy 
would not tolerate time limitation clauses in contracts subject to the considerations of 
reasonableness and fairness.”74 
 
A two-stage test for the determination of fairness was adopted which entails firstly ascertaining 
whether or not the clause in question is unreasonable and secondly if the clause is reasonable 
whether or not it should be enforced.75  
 
Referring to the dissenting judgment of Sachs J, Ngcobo J reiterated the importance of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda but that: 
 
                                                          
71 Barkhuizen decision (n 60). 
72 Napier v Barkhuizen (569/2004) [2005] ZASCA 119. 
73 Ibid par 12. 
74 Barkhuizen decision (n 60) 48. 
75 Ibid par 56. 
17 
 
“… the general rule that agreements must be honoured cannot apply to immoral agreements which violate 
public policy. As indicated above, courts have recognised this and our Constitution re-enforces it.  
Furthermore, the application of pacta sunt servanda often raises the question whether a purported 
agreement or pact is indeed a real one, in other words whether true consensus was reached. Therefore 
the relevance of power imbalances between contracting parties and the question whether true consensus 
could for that matter ever be reached, have often been emphasised.” 
 
Following the judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier76 the Supreme Court of Appeal had the 
opportunity to decide on the fairness of a bank’s decision to close its customer’s accounts in 
the matter of Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd77. 
 
Harms DP confirmed that “the case is about fairness as an over-arching principle, and nothing 
more”78 and that “fairness is not a free-standing requirement for the exercise of a contractual 
right…”79 
 
The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of appeal as the appellant could not 
demonstrate that the bank’s decision to close the appellant’s bank accounts was contrary to any 
public policy considerations and in making this finding Harms DP confirm that it was not a 
courts obligation to make a finding based on fairness where no identifiable public policy 
considerations are under consideration.80 
 
In the recent judgment in the matter Beadica 231 CC and Others v Trustees for the time being 
of the Oregon Trust and Others 81 the issue regarding when a court may refuse to enforce the 
terms and conditions of a contract was clarified. 
 
Theron J reaffirmed the importance of the pacta servunda sunt principal in our law and the fact 
that an individual judge’s sense of fairness cannot be the measure by which decisions are made 
regarding the enforcement of contractual terms.82  
 
                                                          
76 Barkhuizen decision (n 60). 
77 Bredenkamp decision (n 9). 
78 Ibid par 30 
79 Ibid par 53. 
80 Ibid par 64 and 65. 
81 Beadica decision (n 16). 
82 Ibid par 81 to 85. 
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Importantly, the judgment confirmed that “It is only where a contractual term, or its 
enforcement, is so unfair, unreasonable or unjust that it is contrary to public policy that a court 
may refuse to enforce it.”83 Judges must exercise this exercise this power with restraint, 
however: 
 
“The degree of restraint to be exercised must be balanced against the backdrop of our constitutional rights 
and values. Accordingly, the “perceptive restraint” principle should not be blithely invoked as a 
protective shield for contracts that undermine the very goals that our Constitution is designed to achieve.  
Moreover, the notion that there must be substantial and incontestable “harm to the public” before a court 
may decline to enforce a contract on public policy grounds is alien to our law of contract.”84 
 
The court ultimately dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the applicants had failed to 
demonstrate that the enforcement of the terms of the contract would be contrary to public 
policy.85 
 
Whilst the common law has now been developed to ensure that it reflects the current societal 
needs and values of South Africa as well as public policy considerations, judges still have a 
limited discretion regarding when a contractual term will not be enforced.86 
In light of the above, there was and is still a need for the government to protect South Africans 
from exploitation and unfair contract terms and to “legislate against contractual unfairness, 
unreasonableness, unconscionability or oppressive contractual provisions, however, remains 
crucial particularly in light of the inherent limits of judicial control.”87 
 
Legislative intervention would protect consumers by ensuring that they are not exploited or 
abused by banks.88 
 
4 FAIRNESS IN THE BANK-CUSTOMER CONTRACT 
 
Banks hold a very important place in society as almost every person will either have a bank 
account or make use of the services of a bank at some point in their life. Banks are also in a 
                                                          
83 Ibid par 80. 
84 Ibid par 90. 
85 Ibid par 102. 
86 Ibid par 80. 
87 Mupangavanhu (n 10). 
88 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 8). 
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powerful position over customers particularly in South Africa where to a large degree 
customers are financially illiterate.89 The assumption upon which the pacta servunda sunt 
principle is based i.e. that parties to a contract have freedom of choice when entering into a 
contract and that there is equal bargaining power between the parties when the terms and 
conditions of the contract are negotiated90 cannot be said to be entirely true in the bank 
customer relationship and customers generally have to accept the terms and conditions of 
standard form contracts as the banks can adopt a take it or leave it approach due to their 
dominant position.91 
 
It is commonly accepted that banks owe their customers a duty of care to execute instructions 
from their customers timeously, in good faith and without negligence.92  
 
This duty arises from the contractual relationship between the bank and its customer, however, 
there are few recognised requirements for fairness/good faith being included in the terms and 
conditions of the contracts between banks and their customers other than those included in the 
Consumer Protection Act93, National Credit Act94 and the Financial Services Board’s Treating 
Customers Fairly guidelines. 
 
In the matter of Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited 95 the appellant sought 
to have a contract set aside on the basis that it was a standard form contract which had been 
accepted in conditions of unbalanced bargaining power and the exercise of the terms of the 
contract by the bank was unfair and as set out above, Harms DP held that “fairness is not a 
free-standing requirement for the exercise of a contractual right…”96 
 
The laws and regulations which banks are subjected to have been generally part of public 
banking law and overseen by regulatory authorities who enforce minimum standards and 
                                                          
89 Wentzel, Diatha, and Yadavalli “An investigation into factors impacting financial exclusion at the bottom of 
the pyramid in South Africa” 2016 Development Southern Africa 203 214 and Republic of South Africa 
National Treasury, “A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better” National Treasury Policy Document 
23 February 2011 www.nationaltreasury.gov.za (2-9-2018) 50. 
90 Hutchison and Pretorius (n 44) 23. 
91 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 8) 19. 
92 Hanley decision (n 31) 25; Sharrock (n 20) 126 140; Moorcroft (n 2) 15-3. 
93 68 of 2008. 
94 34 of 2005. 
95 Bredenkamp decision (n 9). 
96 Ibid par 53. 
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prudential requirements to ensure that banks conduct their business within acceptable 
parameters of financial risk.97 
 
Furthermore as discussed above fairness and good faith are often overlooked in favour of legal 
certainty or the enforcement of contracts which have been properly entered into.  
 
Where does this leave fairness in respect of the bank-customer contract? 
 
4.1 The Code of Banking Practice 
 
One of the ways in which the banking industry in South Africa tried to ensure fairness in the 
bank-customer contract was through self-regulation through Code of Banking Practice and the 
setting up of the office of the Ombudsman for Banking Services.98 
 
All registered banks in South Africa are members of the Banking Association of South Africa 
(“BASA”). BASA is mandated by the banking industry to represent its interests and to establish 
and maintain the best possible platform on which banks can do responsible, competitive and 
profitable banking.99  
 
Before the drafting and coming into operation of the Code of Banking Practice the “third party” 
responsible for the mediation of disputes between banks and their customers was the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Banking Council of South Africa (the precursor to BASA). 
 
The situation was untenable as the impartiality and independence of this dispute resolution 
process could not be guaranteed and it became clear to the banking industry that it was 
necessary to establish a dispute resolution policy for the industry and set up an office of the 
Banking Ombudsman.100  
 
The policy was contained in the Code of Banking Practice which sets out the minimum 
standards of conduct which customers can expect to receive from their banks and the process 
                                                          
97 De Jager (n 31) 127-140. 
98 du Toit “Reflections on the South African Code of Banking Practice” 2014 TSAR 568. 
99 See www.banking.org.za/about_us/overview/overview.aspx. 
100 Schulze “The South African Banking Adjudicator — A brief overview” 2000 SA Merc LJ 38. 
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customers need to follow in the event that a dispute arises with their bank and provides for the 
referral of disputes to the Ombudsman for Banking Services. The first Code of Banking 
Practice became effective in 2004 and was replaced by the current version (“the Code”) which 
became effective on 1 January 2012. 
 
It is important to note that the Code is a voluntary code and the adherence to the provisions of 
the Code “rests on the moral and ethical convictions of the member banks.”101 
 
The reasons behind the drafting of the Code were, amongst others, that there was a need to 
improve the public image of banks as the banking industry was being criticised by government 
and consumer bodies regarding the level of service customers were receiving and the banking 
industry was perceived to be out of step with developments in other jurisdictions to establish 
ombudsman schemes. It also appeared that the government would introduce regulation if the 
industry did not regulate itself.102 
 
The preamble to the Code describes the purpose of the Code and the key priciples on which 
the Code is based: 
 
“The Code of Banking Practice (“the Code”) is a voluntary code that sets out the minimum standards for 
service and conduct you can expect from your bank with regard to the services and products it offers, 
and how we would like to relate to you. The Code only applies to personal and small business customers. 
 
The Code will be a guide for you when you transact with your bank and it will help you better understand 
your rights and responsibilities as well as your bank’s responsibilities in serving you. We are committed 
to meeting the standards set out in this Code. Our relationship with you will be guided by four key 
principles, namely fairness, transparency, accountability and reliability.”103 
 
It is notable that fairness is one of the guiding principles of the Code. Fairness has also been 
introduced through the following provisions of the Code:- 
 
“This Code has been developed to:  
 
                                                          
101 Coovadia “Foreward” in Pillay (ed) Handbook of the Banking Ombudsman (2013).  
102 Pillay Handbook of the Banking Ombudsman (2013) 1. 
103 Preamble to the Code of Banking Practice 2012. 
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2.1  promote good banking practices by setting minimum standards for your bank when dealing with 
you;  
 
2.2  increase transparency so that you can have a better understanding of what you can reasonably 
expect of the products and services;  
 
2.3  promote a fair and open relationship between you and your bank; and  
 
2.4  foster confidence in the banking system. 
 
3.1  Your entitlements  
 
As a customer or potential customer you can expect the following reasonable conduct from your bank as 
more fully outlined and detailed in the body of the Code. Your bank will:  
 
Act fairly, reasonably and ethically towards you.  
 
4.  Our key commitments  
 
We, the members of The Banking Association South Africa, undertake that we will act fairly and 
reasonably in a consistent and ethical manner toward you. 
 
6.5.1  Terms and Conditions  
 
We will ensure that:  
 
6.5.1.1  our Terms and Conditions are fair, lawful and written in plain and 
understandable language. Legal and technical language will only be used 
where necessary and the Terms and Conditions will be clearly distinguishable 
from marketing or promotional material;”104 
 
Clearly fairness is an important element of the Code however the enforcement of the Code in 
reported case law has not been widespread. It has been submitted that the Code may only give 
rise to contractual rights and obligations if the Code is made applicable to the contract when a 
contract is concluded.105 
 
                                                          
104 Code of Banking Practice 2012. 
105 Moorcroft (n 2) 13-6 13-7. 
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Moorcroft is of the view that the provisions of the code are binding106, Shulze107 and du Toit108 
are of the view that if a particular banking practice or trade usage has been included in the Code 
it is a strong indication that the banking practice or trade usage qualified or existed as a banking 
practice or trade usage in its own right before its inclusion in the Code. 
 
The Code may, however, only be a mere indication of what good banking practice is and may 
not be specifically applicable to all contracts.109 When a court is considering whether or not 
certain conduct by a bank is unfair or negligent the court will consider the provisions of the 
Code.110 Importantly and arguably for reputational reasons a bank would not want to admit that 
it has acted contrary to the provisions of the Code.111 
 
Although reference has been made to the Code in several judgments112, the question whether 
or not the Code can be relied upon and is legally binding has unfortunately not been decided 
by the courts.113 
 
4.2 The Ombudsman for Banking Services 
 
The provisions of the Code are enforced, almost entirely, through the office of the Ombudsman 
for Banking Services. The Ombudsman for Banking Services is established in terms of the 
Code114 as well as the now repealed Financial Service Ombuds Schemes Act.115 The 
Ombudsman for Banking Services is an independent body which adjudicates disputes between 
banks and their customers and may make a determination based on the Code or on the law or 
make a recommendation in other circumstances including those based on equity and fairness.116 
 
The criteria used by the Ombudsman for Banking Services to resolve disputes includes the 
following: 
 
                                                          
106 Moorcroft (n 2) 13-6 13-7. 
107 Shulze (n 31) 438 456. 
108 du Toit (n 98) 568. 
109 Shulze (n 31) 438 456. 
110 Moorcroft (n 2) 13-6 13-7. 
111 Moorcroft (n 2) 13-6 13-7. 
112 Muthusamy v Nedbank Ltd 2010 ILJ 1453 (LC) and Bredenkamp decision (n 9).  
113 du Toit (n 98) 568. 
114 Code of Banking Practice 2012 36. 
115 37 of 2004. 
116 Pillay (n 102) 3. 
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“1. The law, especially FSOS and NCA;  
2. Applicable industry codes or guidelines;  
3. Good banking practice;  
4. Banking practice in other jurisdictions; and  
5. Fairness in all the circumstances.” 117  
 
The Ombudsman for Banking Services has limited powers and/or authority to enforce the 
provisions of the Code and by implication ensure fairness because it may only adjudicate on 
matters referred to the office by individual customers. It is not a regulatory body and cannot 
take punitive action against banks for conduct which is contrary to the Code or where banks 
have been found to have acted unfairly or negligently towards their customers.118 Awards are 
made for possible distress and inconvenience suffered by a customer due to the conduct of the 
bank, however, these awards are made primarily to repair the relationship between the bank 
and its customer and not to punish the bank and/or enrich the customer.119 
 
The Ombudsman for Banking Services also does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on all 
banking related complaints and for example does not have jurisdiction over a bank's general 
interest rate policy or fees and charges policy. The jurisdiction is also limited to small business 
customers with a turnover of R10million per year or less and complaints by natural persons 
which relate to claims of up to a maximum of R2million.120 
 
As the Ombudsman for Banking Services may only adjudicate on matters referred to the office 
by individual customers its ability to influence banks’ conduct and ensure fairness in banks’ 
dealings with customers is limited. For example, the Ombudsman for banking services opened 
6 472 formal cases in 2019121 whilst it has been estimated that approximately 77.13% of South 
Africa’s adult population of 38.13 million are banked or have access to formal banking.122 
 
                                                          
117 Ombudsman for Banking Services South Africa Terms of reference 2006 2. 
118 Ombudsman for Banking Services South Africa Terms of reference 2006. 
119 Ombudsman for Banking Services South Africa Bulletin 4 Distress and Inconvenience awards 
https://www.obssa.co.za/publications/bulletins/?post_page=1 (25-01-2021); Pillay (n 100) 19 20. 
120 Ombudsman for Banking Services South Africa Terms of Reference 2006. 
121 Ombudsman for Banking Services South Africa Annual report 2019 
https://www.obssa.co.za/publications/annual-reports/ (25-01-2021). 
122 Finmark Trust https://finmark.org.za/data-portal/ZAF/2016 (17-01-2021). 
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This is not to say that the Ombudsman for Banking Services does not fulfil an important 
function in resolving disputes between banks and their customers, it is however evident from 
the above that the activities of the Ombudsman’s office and its reach are limited. 
 
The assessment of the complaints received by a bank, for example the number and the conduct 
which is being complained about, is an important and effective measure by which to determine 
a bank’s fair treatment of its customers, compliance with the Code and the extent to which 
fairness has been included in its contracts with its customer. Again, it is unfortunate that the 
Ombudsman for Banking Services only deals with a fraction of the complaints which banks 
themselves receive and it is has therefore been difficult for the industry and the government to 
use the complaints information effectively to determine banks’ fair treatment of their 
customers, compliance with the Code and the extent to which fairness has been included in 
banks’ contracts with their customers. 
 
Banks’ market conduct has accordingly been left largely unregulated and despite the provisions 
of the Code and the interventions of the office of the Ombudsman for Banking Services 
customers were and still are experiencing poor outcomes and unfair treatment and there 
remained a need for government intervention.123 
 
As set out above the general lack of judicial relief for parties seeking redress for a contract that 
operates unfairly in South Africa highlighted a legislative gap that needed to be addressed.  
 
As a consequence of the judicial approach to fairness in contracts, the legislature recognised 
the need for basic consumer rights which resulted in, most importantly for this dissertation, the 
enactment of the Consumer Protection Act124 and the National Credit Act125.  
 
4.3 The Consumer Protection Act 
                                                          
123 Republic of South Africa National Treasury “A known and trusted Ombud system for all” Consultation 
policy document September 2017 www.nationaltreasury.gov.za (2-9-2018) and Republic of South Africa 
National Treasury (n 8). 
124 68 of 2008. 
125 34 of 2005. 
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The preamble to the Consumer Protection Act126 (“the CPA”) sets out that the furtherance of 
the principles of the Constitution and addressing poverty and inequality in South Africa 
provided the basis for the legislature to intervene in contractual relationships.127  
 
The purpose of the CPA is set out in Section 3 thereof which provides amongst others as 
follows:- 
 
“3. (1)  The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
consumers in South Africa by—  
 
(a) establishing a legal framework for the achievement and maintenance of a consumer 
market that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable and responsible for the benefit of 
consumers generally; 
(b) promoting fair business practices;  
(c) protecting consumers from—  
(i) unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade 
practices; and  
(ii)  deceptive, misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct;”128 
 
Ensuring fairness for consumers in the consumer market is accordingly one of the most 
important purposes of the CPA. The CPA also endows consumers with fundamental rights 
including the right to fair and honest dealing and the right to fair, just and reasonable contract 
terms and conditions.129 
 
The CPA governs the relationship between consumers and suppliers of products and services 
and by providing consumers with the right to fair just and reasonable contract terms and 
conditions seeks to address the situation were suppliers of products and services take advantage 
of their stronger bargaining positions by inserting unfair contract terms into their contracts.130 
 
                                                          
126 68 of 2008. 
127 Preamble of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
128 s 3(1) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
129 Part F and Part G of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
130 Layton-McCann “The Role of Good Faith and Fairness in Contract Law: Where do we stand in South 
Africa, and what can be learnt from other jurisdictions?” (2017 LLD dissertation UCT) 29 and Hawthorne 
“The ‘New Learning’ and Transformation of Contract Law: Reconciling the Rule of Law with the Constitutional 
Imperative to Social Transformation” 2008 SAPR/PL 77 82. 
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The CPA defines “service” as including “banking services” or “related or similar financial 
services” and accordingly banking products and services fall within the scope of the CPA.131 
 
The CPA is however only applicable in so far as Section 5 of the CPA132 and is not specific to 
banks or financial services providers for that matter and it has been submitted that the 
provisions of the CPA whilst providing welcome protection for customers in general does not 
provide adequate protection for bank customers in respect of the sophisticated products and 
services provided by banks.133 
 
4.4 The National Credit Act 
 
The preamble of the National Credit Act134 (“the NCA”) sets out that the purpose of the NCA 
is amongst others to promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer 
credit and to prohibit certain unfair credit and credit marketing practices.135 
 
The NCA applies to all credit agreements “between parties dealing at arm’s length, and made 
within, or having an effect within the Republic”136 and its application is limited by the 
exclusions set out in Section 4(1)(a) to (d).137 
 
Similarly to the CPA the NCA provided welcome protection to customers who obtained credit 
from registered credit providers and there have been numerous reported judgments where the 
NCA has been relied upon by bank customers or banks non-compliance used by the judiciary 
as the basis to protect bank customers.138  
 
The NCA is however not bank specific legislation and large parts of banks’ market conduct 
does not fall within the application of the NCA.139 
 
                                                          
131 s 2 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
132 s 5 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
133 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 8) 18 19. 
134 34 of 2005. 
135 Preamble of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
136 s 4(1) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
137 s 4(1)(a) to (d) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
138 For example Nkata v Firstrand Bank Limited and Others 2016 (4) SA 257 (CC) and University of 
Stellenbosch Law Clinic and Others v National Credit Regulator and Others 2020 (3) SA 307 (WCC). 
139 s 4(1) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
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5 LEGISLATING FAIRNESS 
 
5.1 Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 
 
As can be seen from the preceding chapters, and confirmed in the Republic of South Africa 
National Treasury document “A Safer Financial Sector to Serve South Africa Better”140, there 
has been a lack of regulatory oversight of banks’ market conduct. Furthermore, the fairness of 
bank customer contract terms have generally been interpreted in terms of the common law and 
the law of contract which are characterised by the principle of legal certainty and pactum sunt 
servanda. It was therefore the view of the South African government that bank customers were 
not adequately protected and that government and regulatory intervention was necessary to 
ensure that banks treat their customers fairly.141 
 
The Banking Enquiry which was set up in 2008 by the Competition Commission identified that 
there was a major gap in the market conduct regulatory regime in that there was no regulator 
that oversaw the market conduct practices of the retail transactional banking sector. This left 
customers vulnerable to unfair banking practices and contracts despite the consumer protective 
legislation being in place.142 
 
The South African Treasury then issued a report on the financial sector regulation and proposed 
the adoption of the Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation.143 The Treasury Report 
stated: 
 
“The twin peaks approach is regarded as the optimal means of ensuring that transparency, market 
integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient priority, and given South Africa's historical neglect 
of market conduct regulation, a dedicated regulator responsible for consumer protection, and not 
automatically presumed to be subservient to prudential concerns, is probably the most appropriate way 
to address this issue ... the existence of separate prudential and market conduct regulators may be a way 
of creating a system of checks and balances, thereby avoiding the vesting of too much power in the hands 
of a single agency ... the flip side of creating checks and balances is the need to carefully define roles 
and responsibilities to avoid duplication of work and jurisdictional overlap ... separation of prudential 
and market conduct regulation does not eliminate the possibility of conflict between them ... consultation 
                                                          
140 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 89) 41. 
141 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 8). 
142 Banking Enquiry report by the Competition Commissioner by the enquiry panel (2008). 
143 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 89) 50. 
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between the two bodies would lead to an acceptable compromise. But if not, some external means would 
need to be found to reconcile objectives. In South Africa, the formal way of resolving conflict will be 
through the Council of Financial Regulators.” 
 
A further discussion document issued by the South African Treasury on the draft market 
conduct policy framework for South Africa provided context for the setting up of a dedicated 
market conduct regulator in terms of the twin peaks model of financial sector regulation.144 
 
“Financial customers are not adequately protected in South Africa, and more needs to be done to ensure 
that the providers of financial products and services treat their customers fairly. Some examples of abuse 
in the financial sector are high fees and a multiplicity of incomprehensible charges, the design and sale 
of inappropriate products, and reckless lending often paired with disgraceful (and illegal) debt-collection 
practices. Poor market conduct, where financial institutions are conducting their businesses in ways that 
prejudice clients and customers, amplifies challenges relating to low savings and over-indebtedness, and 
undermines steps taken to make the financial sector more accessible to South Africans in order to 
improve financial inclusion.” 
 
As a result of the transition to a twin peaks model of financial sector regulation as well as the 
government’s view that financial customers and bank customers in particular were not 
adequately protected, the Financial Sector Regulation Act145 (“FSRA”) was promulgated.  
 
The objectives of the FSRA146 are to “achieve a stable financial system that works in the 
interests of financial customers, and supports balanced and sustainable economic growth in the 
Republic, by establishing, in conjunction with the other financial sector laws, a regulatory and 
supervisory framework that promotes financial stability; the safety and soundness of financial 
institutions; the fair treatment and protection of financial customers; the efficiency and integrity 
of the financial system; the prevention of financial crime; financial inclusion and confidence 
in the financial system.” 
 
5.2 Financial Sector Conduct Authority 
 
Prior to the promulgation of the FSRA the Financial Services Board was responsible for the 
oversight of the banking sector insofar as it related to advisory and intermediary services which 
                                                          
144 Republic of South Africa National Treasury (n 8) 6. 
145 9 of 2017. 
146 s 7 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
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were provided to their customers in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act.147 The National Credit Regulator as empowered by the NCA148 supervised banks as credit 
providers and the Banking Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank 
attended to the prudential regulation of banks.149 Other than in these areas, the conduct of banks 
and their consideration of fair customer outcomes were not subject to specific regulatory 
oversight. 
 
The Financial Sector Conduct Authority (“FSCA”) has now been established in terms of 
section 56 of the FSRA to regulate the market conduct of banks.  
 
Market conduct regulation can be described as those laws and regulations with the purpose of 
“protecting customers and ensuring they are treated fairly by financial institutions.”150 Market 
conduct regulation is essential because banks often have far more expertise than consumers in 
assessing the quality and appropriateness of the products and services they offer. Unfortunately 
this can create the incentive for banks to exploit their superior knowledge.151 
 
In addition, large banks with substantial market share may charge higher fees, sell products 
that are not appropriate for their customers’ needs and exploit their market power in other ways 
that may be deemed unfair to customers.152  
 
As was demonstrated in the Global Financial Crisis the unfair treatment of customers can lead 
to catastrophic outcomes for the entire financial system, the Global Financial Crisis providing 
much of the impetus for the South African government’s determination to introduce a dedicated 
market conduct authority for banks.153 
 
The objective of the FSCA is to enhance and support the efficiency and integrity of the financial 
market and protect financial customers by promoting fair treatment of financial customers by 
                                                          
147 32 of 2002. 
148 Chapter 2 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
149 South African Reserve Bank “Bank Supervision” in Regulation and Supervision South African Reserve Bank 
(undated) https: //www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/Pages/BankSupervision-
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financial institutions154 and the FSCA has been set up with the express purpose of amongst 
others the regulation and supervision of the conduct of financial institutions and banks.155 
 
To this end, the FSCA has been empowered to make conduct standards.156 These conduct 
standards may be made in respect of financial institutions, representatives of financial 
institutions, key persons of financial institutions and contractors and must be made with the 
objective that financial institutions and their representatives treat their customers fairly.157 
 
Furthermore, conduct standards may be made in order to ensure the fair treatment of financial 
customers in relation to:158 
 
(i) the design and suitability of financial products and financial services; 
 
(ii) the promotion, marketing and distribution of, and advice in relation to, those products and services; 
 
(iii) the resolution of complaints and disputes concerning those products and services including redress; 
  
(iv) the disclosure of information to financial customers; and 
  
(v) principles guiding processes and procedures for the refusal, withdrawal or closure of a financial 
product or a financial service by a financial institution in respect of one or more financial customers 
taking into consideration relevant international standards and practices and subject to the 
requirements of any other financial sector law or the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, including- 
 
(aa)  disclosures to be made to the financial customer; and  
(bb)  reporting of any refusal withdrawal or closure to a financial sector regulator; 
 
In terms of the mandate given to the FSCA, and in order for it to effectively supervise the 
conduct of banks, the FSCA published the Conduct Standard for Banks on 3 July 2020 
(“Conduct Standard”).159 The main objective of the Conduct Standard is the fair treatment of 
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financial customers of banks establishing high level standards which the banks must adhere to 
with the objective of achieving at least the following outcomes: 160 
 
(a) financial customers can be confident that they are dealing with a bank where the fair treatment of 
financial customers is central to the banks culture; 
 
(b) where a bank provides financial products and services to retail financial customers, those financial 
products and financial services are suitably designed to meet the needs of identified types, kinds or 
categories of financial customers who are targeted accordingly; 
 
(c) financial customers are given clear information and are kept appropriately informed before, during 
and after the time of entering into a contact in respect of a financial product or financial service 
offered or provided by the bank; 
 
(d) any advice provided to financial customers in respect of a bank’s financial products is suitable and 
takes into account the needs and circumstances of those financial customers; 
 
(e) financial customers do not face unreasonable post sale barriers imposed by or on behalf of a bank 
to change or replace a financial product or financial service, request a withdrawal or submit a 
complaint. 
 
The sections which follow essentially give effect to the list of outcomes the Conduct Standard 
sets out to achieve and follow the life cycle of the banks’ relationship with their customers 
from the design of products and services, advertising and selling of products and services to 
the termination of the relationship with customers.  
 
Banks are accordingly now legally obligated to ensure that considerations of fairness are 
included, and are of paramount importance in all the stages of their relationship with their 
customers. It is the hope of the FSCA that through banks’ compliance with the Conduct 
Standard there will be a significant reduction in the incidence of unfair treatment of bank 
customers.161 
 
In addition, it is evident that banks will have to take into consideration the needs and particular 
circumstances of each customer or a particular group of customers when providing products 
                                                          
160 Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Statement supporting the Conduct Standard for Banks” 2020 and 
Section 2 of the Conduct Standard for Banks https://www.moonstone.co.za/final-conduct-standard-for-banks-
aims-to-ensure-fair-treatment-of-bank-customers/ (20-01-2021). 
161 Financial Sector Conduct Authority (n 158). 
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and services giving effect to fairness through treating all their customers in a way that is right 
and reasonable but not treating all customers equally. 
 
The FSCA is empowered in terms of the FSRA to ensure compliance with the FSRA and the 
Conduct Standard through various mechanisms including issuing directives162, obtaining 
enforceable undertakings163, issuing debarment orders164, information gathering165, conducting 
supervisory on-site inspections166, and conducting investigations.167 
 
Importantly, the FSCA may issue a written directive to a bank in the event that the bank’s 
treatment of its customers is such that it will not be able to comply with its obligations in 
relation to the fair treatment of financial customers.168 The FSCA may specify the following 
action to be taken in terms of a directive issued to a bank:169 
 
(a) The financial institution ceasing offering or providing a specific financial product or financial 
service; 
 
(b) the financial institution modifying a specific financial product or financial service or the terms 
on which it is provided; 
 
(c) removing a person from a specified position or function in or in relation to the financial 
institution; 
 
(d) the financial institution not paying a specified bonus or performance payment; and  
 
(e) the financial institution remedying the effects of a contravention of a financial sector law. 
 
Individual complaints regarding unfair contract terms or unfair treatment by banks will still be 
dealt with by the Ombudsman for Banking Services and the Ombudsman for Services will now 
                                                          
162 s 144 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
163 s 151 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
164 s 153 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
165 s 131 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
166 s 132 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
167 s 134 – 140 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
168 s 144(1) of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
169 s 144(5) of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017. 
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also have to consider the provisions of the Conduct Standard and banks’ compliance with its 
provisions when investigating complaints.170 
 
The Ombudsman for Banking Services will be required to work closely with the FSCA which 
will use the complaint data to assist in informing corrective steps which need to be taken to 




The South African common law has been slow or unwilling to accept fairness as a requirement 
for a valid contract in favour of a position where contracts entered into legally should be 
enforced. This position is acceptable in circumstances where the parties to a contract have equal 
bargaining power however in the bank-customer contract banks are in a dominant position over 
their customer. 
 
Although the common law has seen some developments in this area, the Constitutional Court 
has confirmed that “It is only where a contractual term, or its enforcement, is so unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust that it is contrary to public policy that a court may refuse to enforce 
it.”172 
 
In light of the common law position as well as the fact that banks did not have a dedicated 
regulator, bank customers continued to be treated unfairly. 
 
With the enactment of the FSRA and the establishment of the FCSA there is no longer any 
question as to whether or not fairness is a requirement in the bank-customer contract in South 
Africa. As required by the Conduct Standard, fairness is now a legally binding requirement for 
a valid bank-customer contract. 
 
                                                          
170 Financial Sector Conduct Authority “Regulatory Strategy of the Financial Sector Conduct Authority: October 
2018 to September 2021” https://www.fsca.co.za/Documents/FSCA_Strategy_2018.pdf (25-01-2021). 
171 Ibid. 
172 Beadica decision (n 16). 
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As set out above, one of the requirements for the validity of a contract is lawfulness.173 A 
contract and/or a contract term which does not comply with an Act or regulation will not meet 
the requirement of lawfulness.174 
 
Accordingly, with the promulgation of the FSRA as well as the Conduct Standard, bank-
customer contracts and/or contract terms which do not adhere to the requirements for fairness 
as set in the FSRA and Conduct Standard will most likely be considered void. It will however 
be necessary for the courts to interpret the FSRA and the Conduct Standard when deciding on 
whether or not a particular bank-customer contract or contract term is void and what the 
appropriate remedy for a customer in such a circumstance would be.175  
 
Furthermore, if banks treat their customer’s unfairly at any stage throughout the duration of the 
contract, in contravention of the banks’ contractual obligations to treat their customers fairly, 
banks will be in breach of the bank-customer contract and customers will be in a position to 
seek redress against the banks for the breach of the contract which would, were applicable, 
include a claim for damages.176 
 
For the most part the Conduct Standard provides for a risk-based approach to compliance and 
banks will have to explain how and why their conduct complies with the conduct standard.177 
Banks will have to take the necessary steps to evaluate their current compliance with the 
Conduct Standard and make the necessary organisational and cultural changes to ensure that 
the objectives of the Conduct Standard are met and that their contracts reflect this. 
 
It is evident that the FSCA intends to adopt a proactive and intrusive approach to ensure 
compliance with the Conduct Standard and by extension the fair treatment of bank customers 
and that the FSCA has been sufficiently empowered for this purpose.178 
 
Furthermore, when disputes arise between banks and their customers related to amongst others 
the unfair operation of the bank-customer contract resulting in litigation, judges will have to 
                                                          
173 Nagel (n 40) 36 37. 
174 Ibid 80. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid 118. 
177 With the notable exception that an express process for the closure of a customer’s account as provided for in 
Section 9 of the Conduct Standard. 
178 Financial Sector Conduct Authority (n 170). 
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take into consideration the compliance of the bank-customer contract with the FSRA and the 
Conduct Standard when deciding on the enforceability of a bank-customer contract and 
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